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Brexit	Writings	and	the	War	of	Position	over	Migration,	‘Race’	and	Class		Ben	Rogaly1		Version	 accepted	 as	 contribution	 to	 the	 Symposium	 on	 Brexit,	 ‘Race’	 and	Migration	 forthcoming	 in	Environment	and	Planning	C:	Politics	and	Space	edited	by	Kathy	Burrell	and	Peter	Hopkins	A	 combined	 bibliography	 will	 be	 published	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 collection	 of	Symposium	pieces		 It	has	been	rightly	suggested	that	Brexit	is	not	a	single,	one-off	event	but	a	process	 that	 exists	 on	 the	 surface	 in	many	 arenas	of	 everyday	 life.	 Part	 of	 this	process	is	represented	by	writings	on	Brexit	‘or	rather	the	vote	to	leave	the	EU’	as	 ‘a	 particular	 kind	 of	 thing’	 that	 needs	 to	 be	 explained.	 One	 of	 the	 ‘many	explanations’	 is	Brexit	as	 ‘a	revolt	or	protest	on	behalf	of	those	“left	behind”	by	forces	 of	 neoliberal	 globalisation’	 (Anderson	 and	Wilson,	 2017,	 2).	 This	 short	essay	 critiques	 an	 influential	 example	 of	 the	 genre:	 David	 Goodhart’s	 (2017a)	
The	Road	to	Somewhere:	The	Populist	Revolt	and	the	Future	of	Politics	(henceforth	
TRS).	Although	presented	as,	among	other	things,	an	explanation	of	the	outcome	of	 the	UK	 referendum	on	EU	membership	 in	 2016,	 the	 post-liberal,	 nationalist	view	 espoused	 in	 TRS	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 part	 of	 a	 Gramscian	 ‘war	 of	 position’	(Forgacs,	1988,	431),	an	ideological	play	for	hearts	and	minds	(Jones	et	al,	2017,	75-78;	Stephens,	2016).		Goodhart	presents	his	book	as	a	robust	study	of	social	trends	that	need	to	be	better	understood	by	the	‘political	class’	(TRS,	233).	However,	it	does	not	take	much	 of	 a	 critical	 eye	 to	 see	 it	 as	 a	 marshalling	 of	 arguments	 designed	 to	persuade	 its	 readers	 of	 a	 particular	 politics.	 Six	months	 after	 the	 triggering	 of	Article	50	by	the	UK	government,	Goodhart	deployed	a	summary	of	the	book	to	support	the	position	 in	ongoing	debates	over	the	form	of	Brexit	 that,	 in	certain	circumstances,	‘the	vast	majority	of	Brits	could	come	together	to	make	a	success																																									 																					1	I	am	grateful	to	Gurminder	Bhambra,	Amy	Clarke,	Churnjeet	Mahn	and	Mark	Richards	for	discussions	on	the	ideas	in	this	paper.	Views	expressed	and	any	errors	are	mine	alone.		
of	that	journey	over	the	cliff	edge’	(Goodhart,	2017b).	The	central	contention	of	
TRS	 is	 that	 there	 are	 two	 prevalent	 ideological	 perspectives	 in	 Britain,	 which	Goodhart	 refers	 to	 as	 ‘Anywhere’	 and	 ‘Somewhere’,	 and	 which	 map	 in	approximate	and	complex	ways	onto	two	groups	of	people	in	society,	to	which	he	gives	 the	 corresponding	 labels,	 ‘Anywheres’	 and	 ‘Somewheres’.	 While	 he	attributes	 a	 range	 of	 views	 to	 each	 group,	 Goodhart’s	 central	 point	 is	 that	Somewheres	are	unhappy	with	the	pace	and	extent	of	‘cultural	change’	since	the	1960s,	 in	 particular	 with	 the	 growing	 ethnic	 diversity	 of	 Britain,	 mass	immigration,	 and	 the	 legacy	 of	multicultural	 policies.	 Anywheres,	 on	 the	 other	hand,	 are	 comfortable	 with	 such	 change	 because	 they	 are	 mostly	 university	graduates,	 and,	 therefore,	 under	 the	 UK’s	 residential	 university	 system,	 much	more	likely	to	live	away	from	the	place	they	grew	up	in	than	Somewheres.		‘[M]y	two	 tribes	 capture	 the	 reality	 of	 Britain’s	 central	worldview	 divide’	 (TRS,	 23).	The	 Brexit	 vote,	 as	 Goodhart	 would	 like	 his	 readers	 to	 understand	 it,	 was	 a	‘revolt’	by	Somewhere	people	against	the	dominance	of	policies	and	social	trends	with	 which	 Anywheres	 are	 comfortable;	 he	 portrays	 it	 as	 Somewheres	 taking	back	a	degree	of	relative	power	in	the	national	polity.	Goodhart	does	not	pretend	to	be	a	Somewhere	himself,	defining	himself	as	 an	Anywhere	 in	 terms	of	his	 lifestyle	and	 the	 circles	he	mixes	 in.	The	 latter	come	 across	 as	 elite	 –	 for	 example,	 he	 describes	 an	 Oxford	 College	 dinner	 in	2011,	where	he	sits	between	the	then	cabinet	secretary	and	the	Director-General	of	the	BBC	(TRS,	15).	Moreover,	Goodhart	tells	readers	that	he	voted	Remain	in	the	2016	Referendum,	and	mentions	his	association	with	Blue	Labour	(TRS,	vii).	There	 is	 an	 insidiousness	 in	 Goodhart’s	 self-presentation	 in	 TRS	 and	 in	 his	presentations	 of	 the	 work	 in	 the	 media	 and	 elsewhere.	 He	 tries	 to	 sound	reasonable	and	open-minded	increasing	the	chances	that	the	disproportionately	white,	 male,	 public-school	 educated	 media	 colleagues	 who	 provide	 him	 a	platform	may	see	him	as	‘one	of	us’	and	all	the	more	authoritative	for	it.		Yet	 while	 Goodhart	 tries	 to	 use	 TRS	 to	 gain	 readers’	 trust	 for	 a	 new	common	 sense,	 his	 own	 racialised	 authoritarian	 paternalism	 is	 never	 far	 from	the	 surface	 (see	Mishra,	 2017).	With	 an	 air	 of	 regret	 for	 a	 lost	 past	 Goodhart	argues	that	what	he	calls	the	British	‘traditional	elite’	is	‘much	less	likely	than	in	earlier	 generations	 to	 remain	 connected	 to	 Somewheres	 through	 land	
ownership,	the	church,	the	armed	forces	or	as	an	employer’	(TRS,	4).	Elsewhere	he	adds	that	‘neither	the	affluent	nor	employers	feel	the	same	obligation	towards	‘their’	working	class	that	they	once	did’	(TRS,	6,	emphasis	added).	Goodhart	pays	far	too	little	attention	to	the	common	inheritance	among	all	working	class	people	of	 the	 devastation	 of	 de-industrialisation,	 and	 the	 fallout	 of	 the	 2008	 banking	crisis	(Khan	and	Shaheen,	2017).	Instead	he	furthers	divisive	ideas	about	‘central	and	eastern	Europeans	some	of	whom	act	like	commuter	immigrants	and	make	no	 effort	 to	 mix	 while	 others	 are	 settling	 and	 integrating	 well’	 (TRS,	 130).	Although	elsewhere	he	acknowledges	that	integration	is	a	two-way	process,	the	breezy	 language	 of	 ‘act	 like’	 and	 ‘make	 no	 effort’	 seems	 to	 place	 the	 onus	 on	recently	 arrived	 international	 migrants.	 Goodhart	 does	 not	 have	 it	 in	 for	international	 migrants	 and	 minorities	 alone.	 He	 asserts	 that	 education	 and	geographical	 mobility	 are	 the	 key	 divides	 in	 British	 society,	 attacking	universities,	academics	and	students,	while	acknowledging	at	the	same	time	that	approximately	 50	 per	 cent	 of	 young	people	 now	 attend	university	 –	 hardly	 an	elite	minority.	Goodhart’s	nationalist	anti-immigration	rhetoric	and	his	dismissal	of	 what	 he	 refers	 to	 as	 ‘globalist	 leftism’	 (2017c)	 contain	 echoes	 of	 late	nineteenth	century	battles	over	migration,	‘race’	and	national	identity	in	Britain	to	which	I	will	return.	First	though	it	is	important	to	look	more	closely	at	Goodhart’s	use	of	‘we’/	‘us’.	 Goodhart	 is	 particularly	 concerned	 that	 those	 whom	 he	 sees	 as	 further	removed	 in	 cultural	 terms	 from	 what	 he	 calls	 ‘the	 mainstream’	 (2017,	 131)	should	not	receive	equal	treatment	or	status	in	the	national	polity.	Although	he	does	not	define	what	‘mainstream’	is	in	the	UK	context,	he	implies	that	nationals	of	eastern	and	central	European	EU	countries	are	further	removed	from	it	than	western	 and	 southern	 European	 ones,	 as	 are,	 not	 only	 international	 migrant	people	 of	 colour	 from	 Africa	 and	 Asia,	 but,	 at	 some	 points	 in	 the	 book,	 their	descendants	too,	regardless	of	their	citizenship.i	This	is	especially	shaky	ground	for	 Goodhart,	 given	 that	 he	 himself	 is	 the	 child	 of	 an	 immigrant	 (his	 mother	moved	to	the	UK	from	the	US).	The	implication	is	that	white	citizens	of	the	USA	and	 their	 descendants	 give	 rise	 to	 few,	 if	 any,	 issues	 of	 ‘trust	 and	 familiarity’	attributed	 to	 the	 arrival	 of	 non-white	 people,	 especially	 people	 arriving	 from	countries	in	the	Global	South.	Citing	Robert	Putnam,	Goodhart	argues	that	trust	
and	 familiarity	 are	 reduced	 by	 high	 levels	 of	 immigration	 and	 ethnic	 diversity	‘especially	when	the	people	arriving	come	from	places	that	are	culturally	distant;	absorbing	 100,000	Australians	 is	 very	 different	 to	 100,000	Afghans’	 (TRS,	 22).	Among	other	 things	 this	 assumes	 that	 the	Australians	 are	 ‘white’	 and	 the	 area	they	 are	 ‘absorbed’	 into	 is	 mainly	 ‘white’	 too.	 Such	 deeply	 problematic	assumptions	form	part	of	what	Emejulu	(2016)	has	called	the	‘hideous	whiteness	of	Brexit’,	that	has	been	disguised	in	part	by	social	scientists’	misidentification	of	leave	voters	as	primarily	‘white	working	class’	(see	Bhambra,	2017).		The	explicit	 concern	 in	TRS	with	 immigration	 to	 the	UK	 from	 the	global	south	portrays	a	hierarchical	view	towards	humankind:	 ‘Newcomers,	especially	refugees	 and	people	 from	developing	 countries,	 often	 draw	 out	more	 than	 they	pay	in	at	least	in	the	period	after	arrival	and	do	not	always	have	the	same	sense	of	allegiance	to	a	country’s	norms	or	its	national	story	–	an	indifference	that	was	actively	encouraged	by	first	wave	multiculturalism	in	the	1970s	and	1980s.	This	makes	many	people	 feel	 uneasy’	 (TRS,	 121-2,	 emphasis	 added).	Goodhart	does	not	 expand	 on	 or	 try	 to	 justify	 his	 assertion	 that	 newcomers	 ‘from	developing	countries’	 are	 likely	 to	be	 less	 committed	 to	 the	 ‘norms’	and	 ‘national	 story’	of	the	 country	 they	 arrive	 in	 than	 people	 coming	 from	 other	 countries.	 Like	 the	statement	that	this	can	make	‘many	people	feel	uneasy’	this	implicitly	continues	the	 theme	 of	 lending	 greater	 priority	 to	white	 than	 black	 and	minority	 ethnic	citizens	(see	Bhambra,	2017).	The	problems	with	Goodhart’s	national	‘we’	is	revealed	again	later	in	TRS	in	a	discussion	on	 the	response	 to	a	question	 in	an	 IPSOS	MORI	poll	 in	2004	–	that	 was	 commissioned	 alongside	 his	 well-known	 ‘Too	 diverse?’	 piece	 –	regarding	whether	people	agreed	that	 ‘other	people	seem	to	get	unfair	priority	over	you	when	it	comes	to	public	services	and	benefits’	 (itself	clearly	a	 leading	question).	The	question	was	followed	by	another	regarding	what	‘type	of	“other	people”’.		Asylum	seekers	and	recent	immigrants	were	‘most	likely’	to	be	named:	Goodhart	 writes	 that	 ‘[asylum	 seekers	 and	 recent	 immigrants]	 are	 most	obviously	strangers	to	us,	and	we	are	less	likely	to	identify	with	their	position	or	be	sure	they	will	share	our	norms.	But	few	people	cited	established	minorities	–	implying	 that	 they	were	 now	 regarded	 as	 part	 of	 the	 tapestry	 of	 the	 country’	(TRS,	 122).	 Yet,	 if	 the	 latter	 sentence	were	 true	 (setting	 aside	 the	 question	 of	
regarded	 by	 whom?),	 why	 single	 out	 certain	 groups	 of	 newcomers	 as	 ‘most	obviously	strangers	to	us’?	The	devil	here	is	in	the	‘us’	word.	The	 reader	 learns	 more	 about	 Goodhart’s	 ‘us’	 from	 how	 he	 discusses	racisms	 in	 the	UK.	First,	 rather	 than	accepting	 that	 there	are	different	kinds	of	racism,	he	insists	on	a	narrow	definition.	Secondly,	even	within	this	definition,	he	seems	to	want	to	explain	rather	than	explicitly	oppose	it:	‘And	even	when	racism	is	racism,	when	it	does	involve	dislike	of	or	contempt	for	a	particular	group,	it	is	not	just	about	skin	colour	or	even	religion	as	such,	it	is	about	what	skin	colour	or	distinctive	 dress	 represent	 in	 terms	 of	 different	 values	 or	 behaviours	 or	traditions	and	the	challenge	they	present	to	mainstream	norms’	(TRS,	32).	Again	‘mainstream’	 is	 undefined	but	here	 it	 implies	 the	privileging	of	 a	white	British	and	Christian	lens.	It	can	be	no	surprise	that	the	United	Kingdom	Independence	Party	 is,	 for	 Goodhart,	 not	 a	 racist	 party	 but	 one	 ‘representing	 a	 grumpy	 and	sometimes	intolerant	strand	in	the	British	public’	(TRS,	222).		Goodhart’s	 treatment	of	 Islam	and	 Islamism	 is	 illustrative	of	 the	way	he	approaches	 racisms	 in	 the	 book.	 In	 a	 section	 on	 ‘integration’	 that	 pushes	 a	strongly	 assimilationist	 perspective,	 Goodhart	 turns	 to	Muslims	 and,	 using	 the	label	 ‘Islamism’,	 criticises	 ‘some	 younger	 Muslims’	 for	 ‘combining	 piety	 with	enjoyment	 of	many	 of	 the	 freedoms	 of	 liberal	 British	 society’	 (TRS,	 130).	 This	reads	to	me	like	a	Somewhere	ideology	–	and	suggests	that	Somewhere-isms	are	seen	by	Goodhart	as	ok	for	non-Muslims	but	not	so	for	Muslims.	Islamism	is	used	here	as	a	weasel	word	to	demonise	Islam	and	Muslims	just	as	it	was	in	the	2000s	by	 influential	 journalists	 Nick	 Cohen	 and	 Michael	 Goveii	(Rogaly	 and	 Taylor,	2011,	209-210).	Neither	hate	crimes	committed	against	people	 judged	by	 their	appearance	 and/or	 location	 to	 be	 Muslim,	 nor	 widespread	 structural	discrimination	 against	Muslims	 seem	 to	warrant	 direct	 attention	 by	 Goodhart.	Instead,	 continuing	 the	 thread	of	 identifying	 those	who	do	or	do	not	belong	 to	the	 ‘mainstream’,	 Goodhart	 implicitly	 defines	 Muslims,	 and	 minorities	 more	broadly,	 as	 outside	 it:	 ‘mainstream	 public	 opinion	 is…	 more	 wary	 of	 Muslims	than	 other	 comparable	minorities’,	 going	 on	 to	 justify	 this	 because	 of	 ‘greater	daily	 segregation	 of	Muslims,	 the	 unavoidable	 (sic)	 association	with	 the	 jihadi	violence	of	a	 small	minority	and	 the	recent	 “grooming”	scandals’,	 casting	 those	speaking	 out	 against	 anti-Muslim	 racism	 as	 either	 whingeing,	 exaggerating	 or	
both	 in	 a	 ‘relentless	 narrative	 of	 Muslim	 victimhood	 and	 Islamophobia’	 (TRS,	130).iii		Anti-Muslim	racism	was	evident	to	varying	degrees	in	the	campaigns	for	the	 UK	 to	 leave	 the	 European	 Union	 in	 2016,	 though	 appeals	 to	 it	 were	 not	necessarily	 direct:	 ‘while	 many	 believed	 the	 focus	 of	 the	 UKIP-inspired	Brexiteer’s	 ire	 was	 mainly	 white	 Europeans	 from	 the	 mainland	 undercutting	British	workers,	 it	was	clear	 to	many	within	that	 formation	 itself	 that	breaking	with	 the	 EU	 and	 “taking	 back	 control	 of	 our	 borders”	 also	 represented	 an	important	 opportunity	 to	 limit	 the	 numbers	 of	 Muslims	 entering	 Britain,	Muslims	 whose	 culture	 many	 of	 them	 believed	 was	 incompatible	 with	 being	British’	 (Virdee	 and	 McGeever,	 2017,	 6).	 	 Explicit	 racist	 imagery	 was	nevertheless	used,	for	example	in	the	notorious	campaign	poster	showing	Nigel	Farage	pointing	at	a	large	number	of	people,	mostly	of	colour,	 implicitly	mostly	Muslim,	crossing	the	border	between	Macedonia	and	Slovenia	in	October	2015,	with	the	headline	‘Breaking	Point’,	followed	by	the	words:	‘we	must	break	free	of	the	EU	and	take	back	control	of	our	borders’	(see	Figure	1	in	the	essay	by	C	and	D	in	 this	 Symposium).	 Other	 Leave	 campaign	 leaders,	 such	 as	 Boris	 Johnson,	attempted	 to	 distance	 themselves	 from	 the	 poster,	 but	 their	 high	 profile	involvement	 and	 repeated	 mantra	 of	 ‘take	 back	 control’	 gave	 a	 veneer	 of	respectability	 to	 the	 strong	 presence	 of	 anti-Muslim	 and	 other	 racisms	 in	 the	Leave	campaign	as	a	whole	–	anti-Muslim	racism	was	also	strongly	present	in	the	doomed	Conservative	Party	 campaign	 to	 have	 Zak	Goldsmith	 elected	Mayor	 of	London	the	month	before	the	referendum.	As	 Virdee	 and	 McGeever	 (2017,	 3)	 argue,	 ‘the	 current	 crisis	 in	 Brexit	Britain	 has	 been	 so	 overdetermined	 by	 racism’	 (including,	 but	 not	 only,	 anti-Muslim	 racism).	 In	 a	 recent	 book,	 Satnam	 Virdee	 (2014)	 makes	 a	 further,	crucially	 important,	 intervention	 into	 historizing	 the	 relation	 between	 racism,	racialization	 and	 class	 in	 Britain,	 and	 it	 is	 to	 that	 work,	 and	 the	 historical	perspective	 it	provides	 for	understanding	Brexit	writings,	 that	 I	will	 now	 turn.	Racism	in	the	form	of	white	nationalism	has	a	long	history	in	the	UK,	one	closely	intertwined	 with	 the	 history	 of	 the	 country	 as	 a	 colonizer	 and	 with	 shifting	postcolonial	immigration	laws,	and	modes	of	governance	of	racialised	minorities	(Bhambra,	 2015;	Hall,	 2017).	Virdee's	Racism,	Class	and	the	Racialized	Outsider	
establishes	 clear	 analytical	 links	 between	 colonialism	 and	 the	 construction	 of	whiteness	 and	 national	 belonging	 in	 Britain.	 The	 book	 covers	 a	 two	 hundred	year	period	and,	contra	the	apparently	unchanging	identities	of	the	older	‘white	working	class	men’	that	Goodhart	identifies	as	‘[o]ne	core	group	of	Somewheres’	(TRS,	3),	offers	an	important	reminder	that	the	focus	of	racialized	outsiderhood	in	 Britain	 has	 shifted	 over	 this	 time,	 from	 Irish	 Catholics	 through	much	 of	 the	nineteenth	century	to	Jewish	immigrants	–	known	as	aliens	–	at	the	end	of	that	century,	 and	 people	 of	 African	 and	 Asian	 heritage	 throughout	 (see	 Lentin,	2017). iv 	Arranged	 chronologically,	 the	 book	 is	 especially	 helpful	 for	 its	discussions	of	the	mainstream	political	party	responses	to	the	arrival	in	the	UK	of	Jewish	people	escaping	racist	pogroms	in	Tsarist	Russia	in	the	1890s	and	early	1900s.	 It	 reproduces	 cartoons	 that	 could	have	been	directly	 transplanted	 from	the	Leave	 campaign	material	 used	over	 one	hundred	 years	 later.	 The	 cartoons	warned	of	the	dangers	of	immigration	claiming	Jewish	‘aliens’	were	undercutting	wages	and	taking	the	jobs	of	working	class	British	citizens,	just	as	Irish	Catholic	workers	had	been	accused	of	doing	in	the	1830s	(Virdee,	2014,	26).	The	debate	over	 Jewish	 immigration	 led	 to	 the	 first	 legal	 restriction	 on	 immigration	 in	Britain	with	the	passing	of	the	Aliens	Act	in	1905.		It	 is	particularly	instructive	to	read	of	the	debate	among	socialists	at	the	time	between	those	supporting	a	white	nationalist	perspective	and	those	taking	a	 non-racialised	 view	 of	 working	 class	 struggle	 and	 identity.	 Referring	 to	 the	former,	 Virdee	 (2017a,	 368)	 describes	 how	 ‘socialist	 nationalist	 support	 for	Jewish	workers	attempting	to	organise	themselves	remained	lukewarm	at	best’.	The	anti-semitism	was	barely	restrained.	Dockers’	 leader	Ben	Tillett	wrote	 in	a	letter	to	the	London	Evening	News,	for	example	that:	‘“Our	leading	statesmen	do	not	care	to	offend	the	great	banking	houses	or	money	kings…	For	heavens’	sake,	give	 us	 back	 our	 own	 countrymen,	 and	 take	 from	 us	 your	 motley	 multitude”’	(Cohen,	1984,	28,	cited	by	Virdee,	2017a,	368).	Virdee	quotes	similar	sentiments	supporting	 the	 trope	of	a	 Jewish	conspiracy	behind	 imperialist	wars	expressed	by	 Keir	 Hardie’s	 newspaper	 Labour	 Leader.	 ‘“Wherever	 there	 is	 trouble	 in	Europe,	wherever	rumours	of	war	circulate	and	men’s	minds	are	distraught	with	fear	and	change	and	calamity,	you	may	be	sure	that	a	hook-nosed	Rothschild	is	at	his	 games	 somewhere	 near	 the	 region	 of	 the	 disturbances”’	 (Cohen,	 1984,	 20,	
cited	by	Virdee,	2017a,	369).	Throughout	his	book,	Virdee	shows	how	‘each	time	the	boundaries	of	the	nation	were	extended	 to	 include	more	members	of	 the	working	 class,	 this	was	accompanied	 and	 legitimized	 by	 a	 racialised	 nationalism	 that	 excluded	 more	recent	arrivals’	 (2017b,	15).	He	also	reveals	how	this	was	contested	within	the	labour	movement	often	by	people	whose	heritage	connected	them	to	historical	or	 contemporary	 experiences	 of	 racialization.	 Goodhart’s	Brexit	writing	 in	TRS	defines	 such	 people	 as	 outside	 the	 British	 ‘mainstream’.	 If	 the	 2016	 Leave	campaign	 can	 be	 classified	 (using	 Gramsci’s	 application	 of	 military	 terms	 to	politics)	as	a	full	frontal	‘war	of	manoeuvre’,	TRS	can	logically	be	understood	as	engaging	in	a	‘war	of	position’.	Like	several	other	Brexit	writings	it	forms	part	of	‘a	 phase	 of	 “revolution-reaction”	 or	 passive	 revolution…	which	 follows	 upon	 a	revolutionary	offensive’.		As	part	of	a	war	of	position	TRS	thus	links	to	Gramsci’s	notion	of	hegemony	in	the	senses	of	‘class	alliances,	“molecular”	ideological	and	political	work,	consent’	 (Forgacs,	1988,	431).	 	Goodhart’s	 ‘mainstream’	has	had	enough	of	 ethnic	 diversity,	 is	 ‘wary’	 of	Muslims	 (and	 is	 therefore	 not	Muslim),	and	 is	 more	 culturally	 ‘distant’	 from	 some	 immigrants	 than	 others.	 Goodhart	thus	promotes	not	 just	 a	hegemony	 in	 terms	of	what	he	himself	 calls	 ‘national	fellow	 citizen	 favouritism’	 (2017a,	 228),	 but	 a	 racialized	 hierarchy.	 His	 stated	intention	 is	 to	champion	people	he	calls	 ‘Somewheres’,	whom	he	has	 identified	as	 being	 without	 influence	 over	 the	 direction	 of	 society.	 Yet	 through	 his	definitions,	his	elisions	and	his	 silences,	he	 furthers	a	divisive	agenda,	pitching	his	 chosen	 ‘mainstream’	 against	 racialized	 outsiders.	 As	 Roediger	 (2017a)	 has	emphatically	shown	in	the	US,	the	idea	promoted	by	Michaels	(2006)	and	others	that	 identity	 politics	 has	 weakened	 class	 solidarity	 badly	 misrepresents	 the	historical	 record	 (see	 the	 contribution	by	C	 and	D	 to	 this	 Symposium).	The	US	context	 and	 the	 Trump	 presidency	 are	 of	 course	 distinct	 from	 the	UK	 and	 the	Brexit	 process.	However,	 Trump’s	 election	 too	has	 inevitably	 spawned	 its	 own	discursive	battles,	with	some	writers	as	divisive	and	 inaccurate	as	Goodhart	 in	their	deployment	of	the	ethnicized	category	‘white	working	class’	(see	Roediger,	2017b	for	an	excoriating	critique	of	Joan	C	Williams’	book	of	this	title).	In	spite	of	their	elusiveness,v	multi-ethnic	solidarities	among	working-class	people	are	 the	most	effective	route	to	redressing	social,	economic	and	political	 injustice	for	all	
workers.	And,	as	Virdee	has	argued	so	convincingly,	in	British	history	it	has	often	been	racialized	outsiders	who	have	taken	the	lead.																																										 																					i	For	example,	on	pages	128	(in	the	quoting	of	an	‘eloquent	short	parable’	by	Franz	Timmermans	regarding	the	lack	of	‘integration’	of	the	‘children	(and	grandchildren)’	of	‘many	migrants’),	131	(in	the	critique	of	writers	who	‘give	no	special	weight	to	the	ethnic	majority’)	and	132	(in	the	apparent	favouring	of	an	arrangement	of	‘neighbourhood	demography	so	that	people	from	the	ethnic	majority	can	retain	a	sense	of	ownership	of	the	area’).	ii	Gove	later	became	a	prominent	Leave	campaigner	and	is,	at	the	time	of	writing,	a	minister	in	the	UK	government.	iii	See	Warsi	(2017)	for	an	excellent	critique	of	liberal	commentators	defining	Muslims	as	outside	the	mainstream.	iv	For	a	powerful	illustration	of	the	negotiated,	contingent	process	of	claiming	whiteness	in	the	US,	see	Kelley	(2000).	v		On	which	see	Roediger	(2017a,	chapter	6)	and	Featherstone	(2012).	
